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The Yam ano Disaster 
Matthew Allen 
Many of us have an image of Japan as a society m which there is 
considerable group-oriented mutual interest. A number of authors like 
Nakane (1970), Reischauer (1977), Kahn (1970), Taira (1970), Abegglan 
(1973) and De Vos (1973), to name just a few, have intimated that the 
concept of the group, as opposed to the western value of individualism, is 
the cornerstone of Japanese society. Indeed, if we look at the behaviour of 
Japanese tourists on the streets of Sydney, or at the behaviour of school 
children in the subways in Tokyo, we see ample evidence of this trend 
towards group orientation. 
This concept of the group apparently originated during the feudal era in 
.Iapan, when Confucian ideals were adopted by the shogun to reinforce the 
"natural" order of people - the so-called shinokosho system of social 
hit:rarchy which, from the top of the scale ranked the population in the 
following order: samurai, farmers, artisans and merchants. Loyalty to the 
emperor, the country, the political order, and the family was demanded of 
all social classes. In return the administration was to be benevolent and 
paternal. Citizens were required to show respect to their social superiors, 
and to realise their place in the hierarchically ordered society. 
Some of these values, it is maintained, have been passed on to 
contemporary society. They are manifest in the relations between younger 
and older students, between parent and child, teacher and pupil, for 
example. It has also been suggested that within large corporations workers 
are treated like the children of the proprietors, and the workers in turn show 
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respect to the company and to their superiors, much in the same way as the 
samurai were venerated by the peasants. 
This system has become typified as one of lifetime employment, where the 
company looks after all the needs of the employee for the time of his/her 
employment - a form of economic benevolence, perhaps. In turn the workers 
are loyal to the company. 
After World War Two, the US Occupation passed a mandate which gave 
workers in Japan the right to join national unions and to bargain collectively. 
This was seen as one of the first steps towards democracy, and towards 
building the US a strong ally in the Pacific. Although many workers joined 
unions, and these unions were themselves often formed into Councils and 
Federations of Labour Unions at national levels, the majority of union 
members were members of enterprise unions - that is, unions which were 
specific not only to the type of industry in which the members were 
employed, but also to the company. Agreements were to be drawn up 
between workers and management concerning wages and working 
conditions, company benefits, superannuation and the like. 
In Australia, the United States and Europe there has been a recent move 
towards this system of enterprise unionism. One of the reasons for non-
Japanese attempting to accommodate the union system which is in operation 
in Japan, is that it is seen as helping to reduce the number of days lost to 
industrial disputes. This improves business efficiency, which in turn 
enhances overall economic performance. 
Over the years there has been quite a lot of criticism about the nature of 
the enterprise union system from within Japan. This criticism, primarily 
originating from the Communist and Socialist Party-related labour bodies, 
has been based on the concepts that: there is little democratic 
representation within the system; that the company's interests are defended 
by the unions, who act as the mouthpiece for management; that cases where 
workers actually do have a say in how the production process can be 
improved are rare and misleadingly represented as being the norm in 
industrial relations; and that although productivity in industry in general has 
been improved greatly, it has been accomplished at great cost to the 
industrial workforce. Whereas some of these criticisms perhaps arc a little 
vitriolic, the basis for many of these complaints was apparent in the coal 
industry. 
In this paper I will look at some of the constraints which were imposed by 
an enterpise union on some members' families at a Japanese coalmine, 
following a major disaster. The union's stance in this case should be seen as 
pro-management. One of the major issues which surfaces in this case, is that 
although this enterprise union was basically an acceptable structure when 
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things were running smoothly, and the interests of workers and management 
were aligned, when events moved beyond the control of the company, and of 
the union, the feelings of people who were abused by the system emerged in 
a cathartic display of animosity directed at both the company and the union. 
Rather than being perceived of as a representative body for the workers, the 
union came to be seen as "the dogs of the company." 
The Y amano Coal Mine disaster exposed some of the underside of the 
industrial relations system, and it will be one aim of this paper to display 
some of the problems that one company and its employees were faced with 
following a major methane gas explosion. 
The Yamano mine disaster occurred at the Y amano mine, which was 
officially owned by the independent Yamano Mine Company, a 
subcontractor for the Mitsui Mining Corporation. In 1965 a methane gas 
explosion ripped through the Number Two shaft, killing 237 miners and 
seriously injuring another 150 men. This disaster was Japan's second worst 
postwar accident, and was remarkable for the number of errors which 
occurred before and after the explosion. Although an internal company 
inquiry found that the management of the day were correct in their actions, 
an independent inquiry conducted by the Fukuoka Mine Safety Commission 
found that there were 'suspicions of improper behaviour' on the part of 
management. 
The families of the dead and injured men took the unprecedented step of 
filing a civil suit against both the Yamano company and Mitsui, suing them 
for compensation. This case was started even though the company and the 
union put considerable pressure on the widows and families of the dead and 
the injured miners to give up the case and take a small settlement. 
It was a landmark case for a number of reasons, not the least of which was 
that the courts found that Mitsui was criminally negligent - the first time a 
mining company had been put in this position. This decision established a 
precedent which has affected the outcome of other civil suits within the 
Japanese legal system over recent years. However, before I look at the 
outcome of the case it is worth investigating briefly the circumstances 
surrounding the disaster, and the subsequent actions that took place. 
Historical background 
Since the 1930s Mitsui had owned the colliery in the town of Yamano 
which is situated in Kago-gun, in Chikuho. A large mine which in its heyday 
employed more than 1000 men, it was an archetypal big Japanese colliery in 
that all other industry in the town revolved around the mine. When the 
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energy revolution, which officially sanctioned the move from oil to coal as 
the major energy source, began in the early 1960s the company announced 
its intention to sell the mine to the government under the terms of a bill 
which allowed unprofitable, or bankrupted mines to be sold to the 
government, as part of a government buy-out of the mines. This was 
announced to the local population, who reacted with some consternation. 
In Yamano, when the company declared its ostensible intention of closing 
the mine, the mine workers called a meeting of the local townspeople with 
the aim of discussing their future job prospects. The township decided to 
plead with the company to show compassion, and to continue their 
operations in the town. The company's stance was firm from the outset 
though, and there seemed to be no chance of any agreement being reached. 
Five months after the company's initial announcement that the mine would 
close, Mitsui responded to the town committee, saying that the possibility of 
a second company taking over the running of the mine was not out of the 
question. However, the workers would have to be prepared for a salary 
drop, and for an increase in working hours, with the additional rider that the 
overall production of the mine would have to increase. The union fully 
supported the move to second company status, and exhorted the miners to 
accept the terms of the agreement. 
In short, the company wanted a rationale that could be employed to justify 
cutting wages and costs, whilst maintaining and even increasing production. 
The 'takeover' by the second company- a company wholly owned by Mitsui -
was the answer. Mitsui was prepared to outwait the workers, a ploy which 
often has been used with success by Japanese companies when negotiating 
with overseas cqmpanies. In effect the company was able to change an 
unprofitable enterprise into an extremely profitable enterprise by renaming 
the company. Notwithstanding the new name, the company's management 
remained unchanged. The profits from the second company's operations 
would still end up in the Mitsui coffers, yet Mitsui itself would not be 
required to continue paying miners the previous wage levels. While the 
second company was operating in the black, and while there were few 
problems within the labour force, this system was quite effective, but as the 
subsequent legal case showed, when problems developed within the second 
company, the ultimate responsibility was found to rest with Mitsui. 
One Chikuho academic had the following to say about the process 
described above: 
At the meeting of the townspeople, the people be~ed Mitsui to continue the 
operations. Mitsui probably really had intended to contmue the operations all along 
but from the very beginning had released a load of bullshit that they were closing 
the place down. In reality they were just waiting for the town and the union to say, 
'The Number Two company would be fine, please do it for our sakes.' So Mitsui 
said that for the sakes of the workers they would just have to sell out to the 
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Number Two company because it couldn't be helped. And by doing this Mitsui was 
able to lower wages and increase the working hours with no obstruction. The union 
was not prepared to fight the company. They were afraid that if they argued with 
the company, the company would take steps to close the mine down. Therefore they 
tended to agree with them (Author's fieldnotes) 
Although the townspeople had desperately wanted the company to 
continue operations, the reality of the second company was difficult for 
many of the miners to deal with. Wages dropped to 75% of the original 
Mitsui wages, working hours increased on average to 14 hour shifts, and 
production demands increased by 250%. Safety standards were allowed to 
lapse, and not surprisingly, considering the nature of the work, the long 
hours and the lack of investment in safety equipment, the accident rate 
climbed dramatically in the first year after the 'takeover.' A number of men 
who had worked many years for Mitsui under the original company, quit the 
new company and looked for work elsewhere. Only 18% of the original 
workers remained. A chronic labour shortage resulted. This in turn led to 
the situation where the mine was forced to advertise for miners, offering to 
train them and house them in the emptying company housing. Because of 
the depressed state of the mining economy in the early 1960s, and the 
tightening of the rural economy, many young farmers who had never worked 
in mines came to join the company's new sub-contractors, attracted by the 
prospect of a reasonable wage (compared to farming), free housing, and 
secure employment with a big company. 
Thus only a small percentage of the miners had long term mining 
experience. This was to become a pivotal point in the case that followed the 
disaster. 
Working conditions in Yamano mine 
The facilities within the mine were allowed to remain in poor condition. 
None of the safety, digging, or coal moving equipment was updated since the 
new ownership. Much of the digging at the face was done by hand, and then 
manually passed on to the conveyor belt, which had been unchanged since 
the 1950s. The miners were expected to work long hours in excessive heat 
for poor wages. On top of this, little or no training in the use of the safety 
equipment that was available was given to the men, especially the new 
recruits. This proved to be a major contributing factor to the high death toll 
after the explosion. The Yamano mine had 'safety tunnels,' like all the 
mines, but unfortunately the new miners were not aware of the location of 
these emergency exits, as it transpired. 
One man who was involved in the legal action which ensued described 
some of the safety conditions -
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The cost of the mine which was the determining factor- to make the dig as cheap as 
possible was the only factor that counted. The company just thought that it was the 
only way to do busmess. When an accident occurred the company directors just 
nodded their heads and made placating noises (Author's fieldnotes). 
In the case of Yamano Mine, for example, there were on average 240 
workers on every shift and the company knew that methane gas build-up was 
a problem with this dig. However there were only 190 gas masks placed in 
the mine in case of emergency! So even if a person knew that there had been 
a gas explosion in the mine there was nothing that some of the people could 
do about it. 
Some miners referred to the union as the 'dogs of the company,' saying 
that their position (the union's) undermined any attempts by the miners to 
have independent representation. The union's response to workers' requests 
to the company to improve wages, or safety and working conditions, was that 
if they didn't like the situation they could get out, because there was always 
someone else ready to come to work in their place. The union had a strongly 
pro-company stance which severely compromised miners, and in the longer 
term, miners' families' human rights. 
Equally, mine management was under extreme pressure from Mitsui head 
office to increase production and to make the mine profitable. This was 
achieved through employing semi-skilled, cheap sub-contractors, and 
through ignoring the expensive demands of the FMSC to monitor, and 
improve safety standards. In order to meet the new production requirements 
working conditions were made more demanding, and wages were cut. 
According to Y ano: 
To get away with this the company employed 'temporary workers' who were 
basically inexperienced in the mines, as subcontractors. They had nothing to 
compare the work with and therefore were fairly easily manipulated. The numbers 
of these men increased dramatically, and as a result of these policies the company 
was able to move out of the red (Author's fieldnotes). 
The above ground staff numbers were also cut, so that among other staff 
reductions, the engineering section, which was responsible for monitoring 
gas build-ups, mine construction projects, and the general excavation of coal, 
was operating with barely a skeleton staff. Certainly staff and wage cuts had 
a powerful influence on the company's economic performance. The mine's 
improved production figures in 1965, as compared to 1963, produced a huge 
leap in profitability. They moved from operating at a large deficit to 
operating at a considerable profit. However, as the 1965 accident illustrated, 
this was achieved at an enormous cost, measured in human lives. 
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The Accident 
On June 1st, 1965, the explosion rocked Yamano. Methane gas levels had 
increased to five times the safe limit over a period of hours within the 
Number Two shaft at a depth of approximately 780 metres. Although the 
actual cause of ignition is difficult to determine because the damage to the 
equipment was so extensive, it is thought that a spark from one of the old 
conveyer belts started the explosion. The concussion from the blast was felt 
20 kilometres away by residents of a small farming village, and the pall of 
black smoke was visible from as far away as Iizuka, 30 kilometres to the 
south-east, according to reports in the Asahi Shinbun. 
One man who was working in the mine on the day of the explosion 
described how he perceived what happened. He was 17 years old at the time, 
and had little mining experience, like the majority of the men in the shaft he 
was m. 
I didn't hear the explosion. you know. The first thing that I knew of the accident 
was when the lights and the electricity went out. I was down the !\:umber l shaft, so 
I was quite a way from where the accident occurred. The tunnels didn't connect. 
you see. so there was no way that I could have known what was going on. Anyway, 
because the lights had gone out I thought that it would be a gooo idea to get to the 
elevator shaft and to make my way to the surface to see what had happened. When 
I got there, the union representattve told me that there was no need for panic, that 
we should all go back to our work and use our cap lamps until the lighting was 
restored. 
We all worked until the shift finished you know- for perhaps five hours after the 
explosion. Anyway, when we got out of the mine, we went into the baths and I 
noticed that the men from the other shaft weren't there, so I assumed that they had 
been forced to work overtime again - this happened all the time. As we were all 
leaVIng the gates I noticed the smoke in the atr - it was heavier than usual -and 
asked one of the security men what was going on. He told me that the company had 
saJd that it was nothing to worry about, and that we should all go home. 
I went home, and my mother told me that there had been a huge 'bang' from the 
mine, and she asked me did I know what it was. I didn't. I suppose that it was about 
three hours after this that I was rung up at home by the labour overseers at the 
mine, and asked to come to work to help clear up the mess that a 'minor accident' 
had caused. When I arrived back at work, there were fire engines, ambulances, and 
police crawling all over the place - it was crazy. The labour control boss asked me to 
go down the shaft with the rescue crew to help the men who were stuck down the 
mine. 
After that day I never felt the same about mining again. Down in the shaft there 
was torn and broken machinery which was buckled and twisted. Dust was 
everywhere - you could hardly see in front of your own eyes. And because the 
pumps had been turned off the water was up to our waists. And the smell - it was 
like a terrible fart. I could smell it through the gas mask. When we got out of the 
elevator I stumbled in the water and fell. When I got up I was holding a human 
hand. It was terrible. There were dismembered bodies everywhere. Further down 
the tunnel, away from the site of the explosion, the mine looked like it had always 
looked. There was no obvious damage to the machinery or the roof, although there 
was water everywhere. It was in the tunnels at the bottom of the mine that we 
discovered the first of the miners who had died of methane poisoning. Thetr bodies 
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were lying all over the place, but none had gasmasks on, and their faces were 
twisted in pain. I was so frightened I had to get out (Author's fieldnotes). 
lwano's story highlights the lack of communication with the workers in the 
Number One shaft, something which was emphasised in the legal 
proceedings. However the extent of the company's negligence went far 
beyond this. When the build-up of methane gas had first been detected in 
the Number Two shaft the chief of operations within the mine had tried to 
contact the surface engineering section to tell them to turn off all the 
electricity. This was standard practice in cases where there was a sudden 
build-up in gas levels, because a spark from any of the machinery could have 
started an explosion. Unfortunately for the miners there was no-one at the 
engineers' office at the time, management having decided that it was not 
necessary to have superfluous safety staff on call throughout the shifts. The 
miners then contacted management head office, and notified them that the 
gas levels had exceeded the safe levels by a factor of four, and that they 
needed to have the electricity turned off. 
Management suggested to the miners that their instruments were wrong, 
that they should check the gas levels, and then get back to them about it. In 
the meantime, the management would get someone over to the engineering 
section to check the gas from there. Fifteen minutes later the explosion 
occurred. 
One miner said: 
The company didn't let the miners in the other shaft know what was going on (that 
an explosion had taken place~ because they didn't want to lose proauction from a 
premature shutdown (Authors fieldnotes). 
Even after the explosion, management continued to act irresponsibly. A 
junior member of the office staff immediately called the emergency services, 
notifying them of the explosion, and asking for assistance. Management 
were informed, and they immediately overturned this decision to get help 
from outside. They rang the emergency services and told them that the 
situation was under control and that outside help would not be necessary. 
Miners in the Number One shaft, rather than being contacted to help with 
the rescue operation, were left undisturbed to finish their shift. The inquiry 
found that these actions, presumably performed to save 'face' and to keep 
production running, were negligent. 
Of all the miners killed in the explosion, only almut 20 workers died as a 
direct result of the explosion. The other 200 or so died as a result of gas 
poisoning as the gas circulated after the explosion. The men that survived 
were the ones with considerable experience. They knew right away that the 
The Yamano Disaster 99 
gas was around and tried to make their way to the surface as quickly as 
possible. 
Seventy percent of the miners who were on that shift were employed with 
the subcontractors, working for low wages because they didn't have any 
direct mining experience. This was because it was the Number Two 
company. These were the inexperienced temporary workers who had 
entered the mines for the first time and didn't know much about the mines 
at all. The issue was that the company was required to teach these people 
about mine safety but in actual fact they didn't. So the majority of these 
people had no idea where the gas masks were kept nor how to escape from 
the mine. The people who got out were generally the veterans who knew 
where the exits were. 
The accident site was a long way underground, so even if luck was with 
them the quickest time possible to get to the surface from that site was 
about 40 minutes. And the gas masks only had enough air in them for 30 
minutes. While the masks conformed to the letter of the safety regulations 
the specifications that the FMSC had enforced were really not very useful at 
all. Not only were the numbers of gas masks insufficient and the air in them 
inadequate for the trip to the surface in case of emergency, but also few of 
the miners knew where the masks were kept or how to use them. This was 
because company policy had dictated that safety training was not an essential 
part of their role, particularly in the case of subcontractors. 
The delays in turning the electricity off, in making the miners and the 
engineers recheck the gas levels, and in calling the emergency services 
doubtless contributed to the extremely high death toll, but on top of these 
immediate problems the safety issue and the relative inexperience and lack 
of training of the young subcontractors was a significant factor. 
A cynical perspective would be that the company was determined not to 
lose production, and that it would go to any lengths to achieve this end. The 
reluctance to call in the emergency authorities for fear of a public 
investigation which would result in the mine being closed for an indefinite 
period is relevant here. The delay in calling in the emergency services 
probably cost many miners their lives; in the five hour delay most of the men 
suffocated. Those who survived managed to do so through escaping into 
tunnels least affected by the gas, and waiting for the rescuers. By not having 
anyone stationed at the engineering section for emergencies, especially given 
the established problems that the mine had with methane gas build-up, the 
company also contributed to the disaster. 
However the accident has to be seen in the economic context in which it 
occurred. The mid 1960s were the most severe years for coalmining Japan 
had seen. Under the terms of the coal rationalisation bills, Chikuho mines 
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were being closed at a tremendous rate, the market was being 'undermined' 
by cheap high quality coal imports from Australia, the US and Canada, and 
domestic sales had shrunk to a fraction of the 1950s levels as oil and 
petroleum products competed directly, and successfully, with coal for a large 
section of the domestic energy market. Unemployment was becoming an 
even more serious problem in the coal areas than it had been, and work 
opportunities in the Chikuho region in particular were extremely limited. 
Coal companies were no longer seen as the 'shining light of industry,' and 
few could offer the so-called 'life-time employment' that so pervasively 
characterises foreign perceptions of Japanese business. Given these 
circumstances, and notwithstanding the safety issue, it is understandable, 
though barely so, that the Yamano mine management would consider 
carefully whether they could afford to slow production for the sake of what 
was, after all only a 'little bit of gas.' 
After the accident, which was the second major coalmining disaster in 
Fukuoka Prefecture in two years - the previous year, at another Mitsui mine, 
the Miike coalmine at Omuta, an explosion killed 467 miners - the company 
offered compensation of 400,000 yen to the families of each miner killed in 
the explosion. The union supported this, saying that it was generous beyond 
anything the families should expect. It was equivalent to about six months' 
wages. The company also said that the widows and the families would be 
able to stay on in the company housing for a further 12 months until they 
found other suitable accommodation. The mine was closed down, and there 
seemed no harm in having the families of the dead living on the mine site. 
The families of the dead men were outraged at the limited nature of the 
proposals. Comments such as 'Is a man's life worth just six months' salary?', 
'Why doesn't the union get off their butts and help us? We can't afford to 
live on that amount for long,' were made public by a number of women, but 
the newspapers ignored the nature of their comments by and large, as the 
accident quickly faded from people's memories. 
However, the lack of publicity in the mainstream media notwithstanding, a 
group of Communist Party-connected people who were informed of the 
company's actions by local informants, were outraged at the inadequacies of 
the company's proposals, and soon convinced the families of the dead to 
form an independent group to agitate for better compensation from both the 
union and the company. They were convinced that the women's group - the 
Widows' Movement, as they were to become known - should begin litigation 
against the company. This was seen as the next logical step, after they had 
heard that the company had been successfully prosecuted for criminal 
neglect by the Fukuoka Mining Safety Council. After more than 20 years of 
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court actions and appeals, the families of the dead men were awarded a 
substantial amount of money from Mitsui. 
Conclusion 
A number of points arise in this discussion about the causes of and the 
preventability of accidents such as this. 
1. The accident was caused by a series of misjudgments which had been 
made as to the necessary minimum safety standards for coalmines. 
2. The standards which were applied were not carefully policed. 
3. The reasons for the appalling safety standards in this mine in particular, 
were primarily economic in orientation - that is, profitability had priority 
over all other concerns, and this ideology of profitability was forced on 
the 'new' owners. 
4. Although there was a union, which had as part of its charter the 
obligation to look after the welfare of its members, it had taken no steps 
to ensure that it fulfilled this charter. It was more concerned with self-
preservation than with applying safety standards for its members, in the 
face of the serious employment problems which had plagued the region 
since the introduction of the coal industry rationalisation measures. This 
attitude was to become a serious obstruction to the application of justice 
after the accident. 
5. The system of dependence on the advice of one's senior in the hierarchy 
of the mini business community, and the lack of initiative shown on the 
part of the people monitoring the steady buildup of gas had disastrous 
ramifications. If the electricity had been cut off when it was first 
suggested that it should have been, then there would have been little 
likelihood of an explosion occurring. 
6. The notion that the company would benevolently protect its workers 
was unable to be fulfilled in this instance, because of the reasons 
mentioned above. 
Points four and five were particularly difficult for the families of the dead 
to deal with. It was their resentment at the company's bad treatment of them 
after the accident that eventually prompted them to take legal action. The 
union had taken upon itself the role of, euphemistically speaking, the 
arbitrator in this affray. They were to take a cut of the payouts to the 
families of the dead - 45%. This was enough motivation, given the difficult 
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times its members faced in the years ahead, to try to force the widows to 
accept the deal that the company offered. The sticking point for the 
negotiations between these parties was that the union was not prepared -
nor was the company - to build a memorial to the dead miners. The widows 
were verbally abused, sometimes physically jostled by others in the mining 
village, who said that if they accepted the money offered, then there would 
be more money for everyone else when the company paid the other now 
redundant miners off. 
Rather than the group being involved even at this level, self-interest was 
the motivating factor in the actions of all parties - including the bereaved 
families, who were concerned with eating, like everybody else. The union, 
while displaying solidarity with the company, represented self-interest in that 
they were concerned with their own position, at the expense of their 
brothers, who had died because of no fault of their own. Now, faced with 
economic hardship, their co-workers' families were seen to be expendable in 
their own battle to survive. The union was not able to see far enough ahead 
to consider the benefits of action, either political or legal, which could 
resolve their situation, so encapsulated were they in their ideological net. 
With hindsight it is apparent that the causes of this accident were 
preventable. Suitable training of the work force, rigorous application and 
regular review of safety standards, and establishing improved gas monitoring 
teams were essential requirements in an industry which was so prone to 
catastrophe. Equally, developing standard procedures for dealing with 
disasters would have prevented the delays which cost so many men their 
lives. However, one of the main problems associated with the accident was 
the ethic concerning profit at the expense of human life. This ethic, 
discussed in recent literature on Japan, especially by Mouer, Sugimoto, and 
McCormack in Australia (see Mouer and Sugimoto 1980), and Kamata in 
Japan, is difficult for many non-Japanese to grasp, used to receiving images 
of the efficiency of Japanese industry. We seldom hear of the other side of 
the economic miracle - and of the miracle's dependence on expendable 
Japanese labour. 
In short, although the courts found that management was guilty of 
mishandling the disaster, of negligent behaviour after the disaster, and of not 
following the set procedures for dealing with the monitoring of gas buildups, 
other factors, which were not raised at the court hearing were equally 
important. The structure of the company, the pressure from above for the 
company to turn a profit in its first year of operations, the semi-management 
role of the union, and perhaps most importantly the lack of training the 
company gave the miners were critical factors in the accident. The union's 
reluctance to press for safer working conditions before the accident, and its 
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partisan and sometimes even aggressive stance toward union members' 
families after the accident highlight some of the problems of enterprise 
unionism. Hopefully this case illustrates some of the shortcomings of the 
Japanese labour-management co-ordination and co-operation system. 
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